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Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling
By Ed Hopkins∗
One explanation of altruism is that it arises from “mentalizing”,
the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another
is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good
genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger
together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater ad-
vantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even
though these signals are costly, when such signalling allows better
matching opportunities. Finally, it shown how mentalizing leads to
higher payoffs for both partners in a long-term relationship, mod-
eled as a repeated game with private monitoring.
JEL: C73, D64, D83.
Keywords: Altruism, sexual selection, mentalizing, social prefer-
ences, signalling, tournaments, evolution, repeated games.
One of the biggest puzzles in social science remains that of understanding co-
operation in human society. Existing explanations have usually been based either
on the theory of kin selection or on the theory of repeated games. Yet, there
is much evidence that people cooperate with unrelated individuals even in short
run or one shot encounters. An alternative theory that sees prosocial activities as
an attempt to signal desirability to potential mates has been proposed by Zahavi
(1975) and Miller (2000). This sexual selection explanation of cooperation has
been modeled formally by Gintis, Smith and Bowles (2001). They demonstrate
that an equilibrium exists where a high quality individual can successfully signal
that quality to potential partners by engaging in costly prosocial activity. This
has been called “competitive altruism” (Roberts, 1998). Griskevicius et al. (2007)
present supportive experimental evidence for the signalling role of prosocial be-
havior. They find that romantic thoughts can increase willingness in men and
women to provide public service (see also Iredale, Van Vugt and Dunbar (2008)).
Another recent hypothesis is that altruism is a byproduct of a combination of
empathy and a theory of mind. Perceptions of the emotional state of another
leads to a representation of that state in the mind of an observer (de Waal, 2008).
Building on this basic capacity for empathy, humans have the ability, which has
been called “mentalizing” or having a “theory of mind”, to reason about others’
mental states. Possession of this ability allows prediction of others’ actions, which
is clearly advantageous. But this consideration of the others’ emotional states may
lead us to be other-regarding by default (Singer and Fehr, 2005).
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There are problems with both theories. The signalling hypothesis does not
explain why quality is signalled by doing good, when it could be equally well
signalled by any costly activity (a problem noted by Gintis, Alden Smith and
Bowles (2001) themselves and by Mohr (2011)). After all, the leading example of
sexual selection is the peacock’s tail, where quality is signalled by the investment
of resources into conspicuous waste. Or in a modern social context, why signal
your wealth by giving to charity when you could also do so by conspicuous con-
sumption or simply by burning money? Indeed, Griskevicius et al. (2007) also
find that romantic thoughts increase men’s willingness to engage in conspicuous
consumption.1
The explanation based on the theory of mind has a different question to an-
swer. Even if empathy and the theory of mind evolved together, why have they
remained linked? Specifically, since altruism is often costly, why are those individ-
uals who have both altruism and a theory of mind not evolutionarily supplanted
by those who are mentally sophisticated but not altruistic? There seems to be an
unexploited opportunity to take the benefits without paying the costs.
This paper shows how it might be possible to solve both problems simultane-
ously. Suppose prosocial behavior is an equilibrium signal not of quality or wealth
but of virtue or, more specifically, altruism. If the relevant signal is the level of
contribution to a public good, this solves the signal selection problem as if altru-
ists wish to distinguish themselves from non-altruists, it is precisely in giving or
contributing to a public good that they have a comparative advantage.2 Further,
since it would be necessary to make these visible contributions in order to at-
tract favorable matching opportunities, those who did not undertake such public
prosocial activities would not match as well. Thus, those who have a theory of
mind but not altruism, would have to make the same contributions as altruists,
and therefore would have no fitness advantage.
I assume that one group of individuals, contributors can be either altruists
or non-altruists. Non-altruists’ preferences are identical to their actual fitness.
Altruists care both about their own fitness but also the fitness of others. That
is, similar to the “indirect” evolutionary approach (Frank (1987); Gu¨th (1995)),
individuals’ preferences may differ from their actual fitness. However, in contrast
to the indirect approach, here it is assumed that these preferences and thus a
contributor’s type are not observable. Rather, contributors have an opportunity
to signal their type by their choice of contribution to a public good that will be
seen by another group, observers. One possible interpretation is that the two
groups represent the two genders. In any case, the observers, on the basis of
the contributions they have witnessed, then choose with which contributor to
match. Once matched in a pair, a contributor and an observer engage in a joint
project, such as raising children, the success of which depends on the quality of the
1Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995), Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) and Hopkins (2012) model
wasteful signalling and matching.
2Millet and Dewitte (2007) find that giving in a public goods game and a separate measure of altruism
are positively related with general intelligence.
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observer. A contributor’s fitness depends on the total production of public goods,
minus his own contribution, plus the outcome of this project. Altruists, because of
their intrinsic preferences, contribute more than non-altruists. Precisely because
of these preferences, which do not correspond to their true fitness, we would
expect altruists to have lower fitness than non-altruists. However, altruists may
gain more favorable matches, if observers prefer to match with altruists.
Thus, altruists potentially have higher fitness if they can gain more in improved
matching opportunities than they lose in additional costs of contribution. I find
that the net effect is positive if and only if altruism is combined with superior
ability in the post-match project. An example of this would be if altruists were
superior at mentalizing and mentalizing was beneficial. It also gives a material
reason for observers to prefer to match with altruists. It is further shown that if
altruists do not have superior ability, then the equilibrium cost of signaling will
be higher than the benefits achieved, and that altruism will not be evolutionarily
stable. Therefore it is important to specify the mechanism by which mentalizing
might give a relevant advantage. Dunbar and Shultz (2007) suggest that long term
social relationships are particularly mentally demanding and that consequently
these relationships have been important in developing human intelligence. I thus
conclude by modeling the post-match project as a particular form of long term
relationship - a repeated game with private monitoring based on the recent work
by Compte and Postlewaite (2012) - where mentalizing ability gives a material
advantage. Further, the quality of the observer with whom one matches is shown
to be a strict complement to one’s own mentalizing ability.
There are three apparent problems with the approach taken in this paper. First,
if altruists have an advantage relative to non-altruists, for example, in mentalizing,
is signalling needed? One might suppose that altruists will supplant non-altruists
simply because they are better. Second, why are altruists not displaced evolution-
arily by others that save unnecessary costs by not behaving altruistically? Third,
would not some correlation between altruism and some other form of productivity
besides mentalizing work just as well?
In fact, signalling and altruism reinforce each other. First, I show that the
advantage of altruists over non-altruists is larger when there is signalling than
when contributions to the public good are not observed. This is the case even
though with signalling altruists expend more effort on providing the public good.
This is because the extra effort is more than compensated by the higher returns
from the post-match project due to the better matching that follows once altruists
identify themselves by signalling.
Second, signalling prevents altruists being supplanted by non-altruists who are
equal at mentalizing. In a separating signalling equilibrium, any non-altruistic
individuals would be forced to make the same level of prosocial contributions as
altruists in order to gain favorable matches. Thus, they would have no advantage
in fitness over altruists.
Third, it is important that the productive characteristic has a direct physio-
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logical link to altruism, as has been proposed for mentalizing, such that it would
be difficult to separate them. In particular, the tie in fitness between altru-
ists and non-altruists just mentioned would turn into a strict disadvantage for
non-altruists if there were any costs associated with separating altruism from
mentalizing. However, without these separation costs, the tie could easily go the
other way through small costs to altruism.
The approach in this paper is also novel. It builds upon the indirect evolution-
ary approach that already has been used to explain human cooperation (Frank
(1987), Gu¨th (1995)). Under the indirect approach as in the current model, indi-
viduals choose rationally given their preferences, but these preferences may not
be identical with their objective self-interest or fitness. In particular, they may
have altruistic preferences. But evolution will then select between preferences on
the basis of actual fitness. Here, however, there is a crucial difference. Recent
criticism in economics (Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007)) of this approach has fo-
cussed on its assumption that agents’ preferences are observable by other agents,
which seems difficult to defend. However, here I do not assume that individuals’
preferences are observable. Rather, it is only if an individual’s type is revealed
by equilibrium behavior will observers know whether he is an altruist or not.
Thus, as with the indirect approach, this paper shows that preferences that are
not identical with objective fitness can be evolutionarily stable, but it does so
without assuming these preferences are naturally observable to others.3
The approach here also relates to the proposed “Greenbeard” mechanism for
cooperation: a predisposition for cooperation and a visible external sign (the
“green beard”) are both encoded in the same gene. However, West and Gardner
(2010) doubt whether cooperation based on cooperative or altruistic types being
identifiable could be evolutionary stable in humans, because of the implausibility
of altruistic behavior and external signs such as smiles or promises being governed
by the same small number of genes. Thus, it would be relatively easy others to
develop the external appearance of cooperators without in fact being cooperative.
In contrast, here copying is not easy because altruists are identified by costly
signals rather than their external appearance. Further, the idea behind the link
between altruism and mentalizing is that these two propensities are not separable,
the first follows directly from the second. Thus, it would be biologically costly to
“rewire” humans to be non-altruistic while maintaining mentalizing.
I. Signalling Altruism
There are n individuals which I will call contributors as all of them have to
choose simultaneously and independently how much to contribute to the pro-
duction a public good. Let the contribution of contributor i be xi, then the
3Recently, Alger and Weibull (2013) have also proposed a model of indirect evolutionary selection
without observability of types. However, they do not allow for signalling and matching between individ-
uals is exogenous.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM, MENTALIZING AND SIGNALLING 5
total contributions will be
∑n
j=1 xj and the total amount of the public good be
G(
∑n
j=1 xj), where G is a strictly increasing, smooth concave production func-
tion. Let us also assume that G′(0) ≥ 1 and limx→∞G′(x) = 0 (simple examples
of suitable functions include log x and
√
x).
Following the contributors’ choice of contribution, there will be an opportunity
to match with another set of individuals, whom I will call observers. The observers
see the contributors’ choice of contribution before making their decision about
which contributor to match with. Let the parameter s give the value of the
match for the contributor.
As in the indirect evolutionary approach, an individual’s utility may not coin-
cide with her actual material payoff or fitness. Here, each agent’s fitness is
(1) Φi = −xi +G(
n∑
j=1
xj) + pi(αi, si)
which is increasing in the amount of the public good produced less an agent’s
contribution. The final term pi(αi, si) is the return in terms of matching oppor-
tunities. How this is determined will be described later.
In contrast to the material payoff which is the same for all contributors, some
contributors have an altruistic preference for the welfare of others. Specifically,
the utility of an individual i will be
(2) Ui = −xi +G(
n∑
j=1
xj) +
αi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(G(
n∑
j=1
xj)− xj) + pi(αi, si)
where αi is an altruism parameter. Importantly, let us assume there are m ≥ 1
individuals with αH > 0 and n−m with αL = 0. So non-altruists’ (α = 0) utility
is identical to their material payoffs. However, altruists (αH > 0) care positively
about the material payoffs of others, and thus, their preferences are different from
their material payoff.4
Importantly, in contrast to much of the literature using the indirect evolution-
ary approach, an agent’s type is not known by the observers or other contributors.
One can assume that each contributor’s type is determined by an independent
random draw where the (strictly positive) probability of being an altruist is com-
mon knowledge but the total number of altruists is unknown.
I now turn to how the matching term pi(αi, si) is determined. The fundamental
assumption is that each agent’s choice of contribution xi is observed by potential
matches. These observers, possibly members of the opposite sex, cannot see an
4It has been suggested that the major motivation for giving to charity or public goods is a “warm
glow” rather than altruism, where the subjective utility from donating depends on the donation xi not
the outcome G. Here, one could assume a warm glow alternative specification where Ui = −xi + βxi +
G(·) + pi(αi, si) for some β ∈ (0, 1). All results would be qualitatively unchanged.
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agent’s type, only his choice of contribution. Contributors know that their choice
of contribution are observed by potential matches.
I assume that observers prefer to match with altruists than with non-altruists.
Thus, with complete information so that contributors’ types were known, altruists
would match better than non-altruists. Specifically, if a contributor’s type was
directly observable, an altruist would match with a high quality observer with
probability sH and a non-altruist would have the worse probability sL < sH . See
Section IV.A below.
Further, and this is crucial, the total return to a contributor of type αi from
matching with an observer of quality sj is pi(αi, sj), where pi is a smooth function
that is increasing in both arguments and piαs = ∂
2pi/(∂α∂s) > 0. A simple
example of such a function is pi(αi, si) = αisi, the match return is the product
of the contributor type and the observer type. This assumption on the cross-
derivative implies the property of increasing differences so that not only does an
altruist αH receives a higher payoff when matching with an observer of quality sj
than a non-altruist would, but also an increase in match quality has a bigger effect
on the return of an altruist than of a non-altruist. This assumption corresponds
with the idea that empathy and mentalizing are positively associated, so that
the altruists are superior at mentalizing and that this gives them a higher return
from matching than non-altruists. It will be important in Proposition 5 below.
An explicit model that justifies the assumptions on payoffs to contributors and
the preferences of observers is given in Section IV below.
However, as a useful benchmark, I first look at what contribution agents would
choose in the absence of signalling considerations. That is, I look at the Nash
equilibrium of the public goods game assuming the additional term pi(αi, si) in
(2) is independent of the choice of contribution. For example, it could be zero for
both altruists and non-altruists. Let us call a Nash equilibrium where are altruists
make the same choice, and all the non-altruists choose the same contribution (but
not the same as the altruists), “quasi-symmetric”. Then, there is the following
preliminary result.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose matching success is independent of one’s choice of
contribution, then there is a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all m al-
truists choose the same contribution x0H > 0 and all n−m non-altruists choose the
same contribution x0L = 0. There is no other quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
PROOF:
Suppose that all the non-altruists choose zero. Then the altruists have an incen-
tive to contribute as their marginal incentive to contribute −1+(1+αH)G′(0) > 0
is positive at zero total contribution. Further, as by assumption the marginal
product of G falls to zero as contributions become large, one can increase the
quantity chosen by the m altruists xH up to a level x
0
H such that
(3) (1 + αH)G
′(mx0H) = 1
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM, MENTALIZING AND SIGNALLING 7
and thus the altruists have no incentive to raise their contribution further. But
then it must be that G′(mx0H) < 1 so that the marginal incentive to contribute
for the non-altruists is negative. So, they have no incentive to increase their
contribution from zero and this strategy profile is an equilibrium. Given the
concavity of G, if x0L = 0, the contribution x
0
H that satisfies the equilibrium
condition (1+αH)G
′(mx0H) = 1 is unique. Lastly, clearly, there is no pair (x
0
L, x
0
H)
with x0L > 0 such that both types can be in equilibrium, as (1 + αH)G
′(mx0H +
(n−m)x0L) = 1 = G′(mx0H + (n−m)x0L) is an impossibility.
That is, even in the absence of signalling, altruists will contribute more than
non-altruists. The point is this gives a quite natural story about how initial
differences in behavior could arise. One would expect this would have made it easy
for observers to learn how to distinguish types on the basis of their contributions,
even before signalling behavior evolved.
The main results are, first, to show that there exists a separating equilibrium,
where altruists choose a different level of contribution than non-altruists and,
therefore, are identifiable by observers; second, to determine in such an equilib-
rium which type has a fitness advantage. For equilibrium, we need a contribution
level for the high types xH and a contribution level for the low types xL where
xH > xL such that neither type wishes to deviate. Given the distinct choices of
the two types, in equilibrium observers will correctly conclude that a contributor
choosing xH is an altruist and one choosing xL is not. Thus, the matching return
to the choice xH will be sH and the return to xL will be sL.
5
Consequently, the only way for a low type to obtain the high matching return
sH will be to imitate the high types and choose xH . Thus, the principal incentive
compatibility (IC) condition for a separating equilibrium is that a low type must
gain a higher utility from not imitating, or
(4)
U(αL, xH , sH) = −xH+G(X¯)+pi(αL, sH) ≤ −xL+G(X)+pi(αL, sL) = U(αL, xL, sL)
where X is the equilibrium total contribution X = mxH + (n−m)xL, and X¯ is
the total contribution if one low type deviates, or X¯ = (m+1)xH +(n−m−1)xL.
Equally, if a high type deviates to any contribution lower than xH , she will only
obtain sL. Given this, the incentive compatibility constraint for a high type not
to want to deviate to a lower contribution xL ∈ [0, xH) will be
(5) −xH + (1 + αH)G(X) + pi(αH , sH) ≥ −xL + (1 + αH)G(X) + pi(αH , sL)
where X = (m− 1)xH + (n−m+ 1)xL or the total contribution if one high type
deviates to xL.
6
5To determine the return to a choice of contribution that is neither xH or xL, one must specify
appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs. A sufficient condition for this form of separating equilibrium to
hold is that the observers believe that any agent choosing a contribution xˆ less than xH must be a
non-altruist. For simplicity, this is what I assume.
6There is third incentive compatibility condition that the separating contributions must be at least
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In fact, it is easy to find contribution levels xH , xL that satisfy these IC con-
ditions and, therefore, constitute a separating equilibrium. As in the original
Spence signalling model, there will be a continuum of such separating equilibria.7
PROPOSITION 2: For any m such that n > m ≥ 1, there exists an interval
[xH , x¯H ] such that if xH ∈ [xH , x¯H ] then the pair {xH , xL = 0} satisfy the incen-
tive compatibility conditions (4) and (5) and therefore constitute a pure strategy
separating equilibrium.
PROOF:
Again define xH as the contribution xH that solves the first IC condition (4)
with equality and define x¯H as the equivalent quantity from the second IC con-
dition (5). We have xH < x¯H if
G(X¯)−G(X)+pi(αL, sH)−pi(αL, sL) < (1+αH)(G(X)−G(X))+pi(αH , sH)−pi(αH , sL).
This holds as pi(αL, sH) − pi(αL, sL) < pi(αH , sH) − pi(αH , sL) is true because
piαs > 0 by assumption, and because as X¯ − X = X − X = xH − xL, one has
G(X) − G(X) ≥ G(X¯) − G(X) by the concavity of G. Combined with αH > 0,
the above inequality clearly holds. So, the interval [xH , x¯H ] is non-empty and so
both IC conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.
The non-altruists receive the same matching payoff pi(αL, sL) for any choice of
x in [0, xH) and do not wish to switch to any x in [xH , x¯H ] because of IC condition
(4). By assumption the altruists’ contributions are higher than x0H , the amount
chosen in the absence of signalling considerations. Thus, for the non-altruists the
marginal return to contribution is even lower and so the result in Proposition 1
is easily adapted to show that non-altruists’ optimal choice is still to contribute
zero.
What is important is that in this separating equilibrium, altruists can have a
higher material payoff than non-altruists. In such a separating equilibrium, we
have material payoffs
(6) ΦH = −xH +G(X) + pi(αH , sH)
and
(7) ΦL = −xL +G(X) + pi(αL, sL).
as large as would be chosen in the absence of signalling considerations, or xH ≥ x0H , xL ≥ x0L = 0. This
constraint would only be relevant if the parameter αH is large relative to the size of possible improved
matching sH − sL, but this case is neither plausible nor interesting. So, if xH is the contribution that
solves the IC condition (4), in what follows I assume that xH > x
0
H .
7And there will be a continuum of pooling equilibria too. I do not discuss pooling equilibria here,
but the analysis would be similar to that found below in the section on non-observability.
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Combining these, the material advantage of the high type is
(8) ΦH − ΦL = pi(αH , sH)− pi(αL, sL)− (xH − xL)
This could be positive or negative depending on the relative size of pi(αH , sH)−
pi(αL, sL) (which is positive) and xH − xL. What I now show is that even in
the separating equilibrium that is worst for altruists, altruists will have a higher
material payoff than non-altruists, provided the number of altruists is sufficiently
large.
PROPOSITION 3: Under the assumption that altruists gain a higher return to
the post-match project than non-altruists (pi is strictly increasing in α), if the
number of altruists, m, is sufficiently large, then in any separating equilibrium
the material payoff to altruists is higher than to non-altruists.
PROOF:
If the second IC condition (5) holds with equality, so that we have the separating
equilibrium that is worst for altruists, the difference in contributions will be:
(9) xH − xL = pi(αH , sH)− pi(αH , sL) + (1 + αH)(G(X)−G(X)).
Then combining (9) with the equation (8), the advantage becomes
(10) ΦH − ΦL = pi(αH , sL)− pi(αL, sL)− (1 + αH)(G(X)−G(X))
In the equation (10), the term A = pi(αH , sH)− pi(αL, sL) is a positive constant,
while the term B = −(1 + αH)(G(X) − G(X)) is negative and for a fixed xH ,
by concavity of G(·), is decreasing in m the number of altruists. Further, by
assumption limx→∞G′(x) = 0. So if I can show that X = mxH goes to infinity
as m becomes large, then B is less than A in absolute size, and thus the high
type has a material advantage, for m sufficiently large. The problem is that xH
depends on m. But one has
G(X¯)−G(X) + pi(αL, sH)− pi(αL, sL) ≤ xH
so that xH is bounded below as pi(αL, sH)− pi(αL, sL) > 0 by assumption. Thus,
limm→∞mxH =∞ and limm→∞G(X)−G(X) = 0.
Thus, if the number of altruists is large, altruists certainly have a material payoff
advantage. But note this result does not rule out that altruists will be advantaged
even with small numbers. Indeed, altruists will do worse at very low numbers of
altruists due to an implausible mechanism. The difference G(X) − G(X) has to
be so big that the level of contribution xH by altruists is enormous.
However, notice that this result does depend on the assumption that the benefits
to the match pi(α, s) are increasing in the degree of altruism. If not, then it is still
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possible for altruists to distinguish themselves from non-altruists by signalling.
However, in any separating equilibrium, the material payoff of altruists is lower
than that of the non-altruists.
PROPOSITION 4: Under the alternative assumption that pi(αi, si) = si, there is
no benefit from altruism in the post-match project, in any separating equilibrium
altruists have strictly lower material payoffs than non-altruists.
PROOF:
As X¯ > X, clearly
−xH +G(X¯) + sH > −xH +G(X) + sH
Simply combining this with the first IC condition (4), we have that, in the sepa-
rating equilibrium that is best for altruists, material payoffs must satisfy
(11) ΦH = −xH +G(X) + sH < −xL +G(X) + sL = ΦL
That is, altruists have a lower material payoff.
This results means that, in the absence of superior mentalizing ability, altruists
would become extinct. Note the intuition for this result. The incentive com-
patibility condition is exactly that the non-altruists do not want to imitate the
altruists. The difference between altruist and non-altruists is now only in pref-
erences not in capabilities. Thus, because the preferences of non-altruists are
identical to their material payoff, this means that necessarily they must earn a
higher material payoff from the lower level of contribution if they prefer it to a
higher level. This also shows the limits of the indirect evolutionary approach.
When individuals have to pay to reveal their preferences (and it is a pure prefer-
ence, that is not correlated with a superior ability), preferences that differ from
material payoffs de not survive.
II. When Contributions are not Observable
It might be argued that if altruists have an advantage in mentalizing there
is no need for them to signal to succeed. To investigate this hypothesis, I now
look at the case where altruists are assumed to be more productive, but where
their contributions to the public good is not observed. The question is how this
case compares to the signalling outcome of the previous section. The comparison
would seem to be ambiguous: when not observed, altruists will have lower costs
of contribution, but lower quality matching, as observers will not be able to
distinguish altruists. This is, in fact, not the case. Instead, I show that altruists
are always better off with signalling.
When not observed, altruists will still contribute more than non-altruists. Specif-
ically, altruists will choose x0H as specified in Proposition 1, the privately optimal
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contribution for the altruist type, and non-altruists will choose x0L = 0. Since
observers now cannot distinguish between altruists and non-altruists, both type
of contribution obtain in expectation a match of intermediate value sM where
sL < sM < sH . So, the material payoff to the altruists will be
(12) ΦNH = −x0H +G(X) + pi(αH , sM )
and to the non-altruists.
(13) ΦNL = G(X) + pi(αL, sM )
with the N superscript indicating non-observability.
So the advantage to the altruists under non-observability is the difference,
(14) AN = ΦNH − ΦNL = pi(αH , sM )− pi(αL, sM )− x0H .
In contrast, the advantage to the altruists under the most advantageous separating
equilibrium would be, using (4) and (8),
(15) AS = ΦSH − ΦSL = pi(αH , sH)− pi(αL, sH)− (G(X¯)−G(X))
where S is for separating.
It is easy to show that both AN and AS are increasing in m the number of
altruists. But importantly, one can also show that the advantage to altruists
with signalling is always greater than without observability. This is not obvious
as, while with signalling there is more accurate sorting so that altruists match
better, with signalling altruists also have to contribute more. What is crucial
here is the assumption that piαs > 0, that is, increasing α increases the return to
improving one’s match.
PROPOSITION 5: The advantage to the altruists in a separating equilibrium
AS is greater than the advantage without observability AN .
PROOF:
In comparing AN in (14) and AS in (15), let us first consider the returns to the
post-match project. Note that pi(αH , sH) − pi(αL, sH) > pi(αH , sM ) − pi(αL, sM )
as piαs > 0. Second, consider the cost of contributions. From (3), one has that
G′(mx0H) = 1/(1+αH) < 1. Further, the slope of G is decreasing in contributions
as G is concave. Thus, G((m+1)x0H)−G(mx0H) < x0H . Finally, as by assumption
x0H < xH , and again because of the concavity of G, it holds that G(X¯)−G(X) =
G((m+ 1)xH)−G(mxH) < x0H and the result follows.
Crucially, what this result shows is possible that without signalling, altruism
might not be able to establish itself. For example, it might be the case that
AS > 0 > AN , when the number of altruists is small. If this is the case, then under
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signalling, altruism would spread within the population, but without signalling it
would go extinct. Let us see an example of this.
EXAMPLE 1: Let pi(α, s) = (1 + α)s and G(x) = lnx, and further αH = 1/2
and sL, sM , sH be 1, 3/2, 2 respectively. Then, x
0
H = (1 + αH)/m = 3/2m and,
thus, AS = ΦSH − ΦSL = 1 − ln((m + 1)/m) > 3/4 − 3/2m = ΦNH − ΦNL = AN .
Indeed, in this example, the first altruist would fail to establish herself without
observability, as non-altruists have an advantage when there is only one altruist.
That is when m = 1, AN = −3/4 < 0, whereas with signalling the advantage to
the lone altruist is positive, AS = 1− ln 2 > 0.
III. If Some Non-Altruists Can Mentalize
An important argument in favor of the current approach is that altruism and
mentalizing are directly linked. Nonetheless, suppose that it might be possible,
perhaps at some cost in fitness, to “rewire” this proposed hard-wired connec-
tion. Would altruists survive? To test this, suppose there exists another type of
contributor, who does not have altruistic preferences but is as capable of mental-
izing as altruists. Thus, this type would be equally competent in the post-match
project. This kind of intelligence without sympathy for others is sometimes called
Machiavellian but, more neutrally, let us call this the P-type. We will see that
the outcome is vastly different when there is signalling and when there is no
observability.
Specifically, the P-type has preferences and fitness
(16) UP = ΦP = −xi +G(
n∑
j=1
xj) + pi(αH , si)− c.
That is, he has no altruism as his preferences match his fitness, but he has high
productivity pi in any match. The cost in fitness of separating altruism from
mentalizing is c ≥ 0. Without observation, the P-type will choose x0P = 0 but
gain a product of pi(αH , sM ), where sM is as in the previous section on non-
observability. Thus, the fitness of the P-type will be
(17) ΦP = G(X) + pi(αH , sM )− c
which is clearly greater than the fitness of the altruists ΦNH or of the non-altruists
ΦNL , as defined in (12) and (13) in the previous section if c is not too large. Thus,
without observation, the result will be a population consisting entirely of P-types.
In contrast, where observers do view the choice of contribution, the P-type
would have a choice between the high contribution of the altruists and the low
contribution of the non-altruists (remember that as part of the separating equi-
librium, it must be that a choice of some intermediate level of contribution is
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interpreted as coming from a non-altruist). The high contribution gives a better
match and the net fitness is higher than from the low choice, by Proposition 3.
Thus, the P-types would choose the high contribution. But note that the P-type
now does no better than the altruist and is likely to do worse. Specifically,
(18) ΦP = −xH +G(X) + pi(αH , sH)− c = ΦH − c,
where ΦH is the material payoff to the altruist as given in (6). That is, with a
strictly positive rewiring cost c, the P-type will do strictly worse.
Furthermore, there is no separating equilibrium where the P-types choose some
intermediate level of contribution xˆ ∈ (0, xH) and separate themselves both from
the altruists and the low ability non-altruists. This is because, the contribution
xH is the minimum level of contribution that is high enough to deter the low
types from also choosing to contribute.
Thus one can observe the following. Suppose that altruism and mentalizing are
hard-wired together such that there would be “rewiring costs” in terms of lost
fitness to separate them. Then, when there is no observability, the non-altruists
will dominate if these costs are smaller than the payoff advantage derived above.
However, with observability and signalling, the non-altruists will die out as their
payoffs, before rewiring costs, are no better, so their total fitness is lower. Further,
this also illustrates why one has to consider two attributes that are strongly
linked. For example, suppose altruism was by chance correlated with some form
of productivity other than mentalizing, then the signalling analysis of the previous
sections would go through. But as the link was coincidental there would be no
substantial rewiring costs. Then, a P-type could easily arise that would strictly
dominate without observability and would tie under signalling. But it is easy to
think of circumstances in which the tie would be broken in favor of the P-types,
for example, if only some of public goods games were observed. In summary,
both observability/signalling and rewiring costs are important for the survival of
altruists.
IV. Matching and the Post-Match Project
In this section, I present a model that would generate payoffs to matching
consistent with the assumptions in the main part of the paper. It specifies both
the matching process between contributors and observers and gives an example
of a post-match project in which mentalizing has an advantage. The crucial
assumption is that post-match project is a repeated pair-based relationship. The
most important result shown here is that the payoff obtained in this relationship is
increasing in the sophistication of each participant. Thus, both sides would prefer
to match with the most sophisticated partner available. Further, the payoff of a
contributor will satisfy increasing differences in his type and the quality of the
observer with whom he matches.
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A. Matching
Starting with matching, the simplest assumption is that the n contributors
wish to match in pairs with n observers, after the observers have seen their con-
tributions to the public good. If indeed there is a separating outcome in terms
of contributions then observers will be able to deduce precisely the type of each
contributor. Suppose the observers also differ in quality or fitness with k having
quality vH and n − k having quality vL with vH > vL, but their quality is per-
fectly observable.8 Contributors prefer to match with high quality observers and
observers prefer to match with contributors with high mentalizing ability (α).
Reasons for these preferences are made explicit below.
Suppose k ≤ m, where m is the number of high type contributors, then a
matching will be stable if and only if the k available high type observers are paired
with any k high type contributors, with the m−k unlucky high type contributors
being matched with vL observers as are all the low type contributors.
9 Further,
let us assume that one of these stable matchings is chosen at random. Then the
probability of a high type contributor matching with a high quality observer is
k/m. Low quality contributors match with certainty with a low quality observer.
So now we can define s in terms of the probability of matching with a high value
observer, so that sH = k/m and sL = 0.
If instead k > m, then some low type contributors can match with high quality
observers. Thus, in this case instead one would have sH = 1 and sL = (k −
m)/(n −m). Note that what is important is simply that sH > sL and this will
hold in all cases as long as n > k ≥ 1.
Finally, suppose as in Section II, contributions are not observable and so all
match at random. Then, it is easy to define sM = k/n < k/m = sH . All these
results could be easily generalized to the case where the number of observers is
not equal to the number of contributors.
B. Post-Match Project as a Repeated Game
I now turn from the matching process to the post-match project. In surveying
research on the evolution of the human brain, Dunbar (2008) argues that long term
pair bonding is particularly cognitively demanding. Issues of coordination and
monitoring are possible causes of this complexity. He writes that it is this “specific
need that may have provided the trigger for the evolution of those social cognitive
skills associated with theory of mind in humans” (p18). Thus, it seems reasonable
to consider a long term relationship as the post-match project, a relationship in
which cognitive skills are important.
8It would be possible to assume that observers, like contributors, have to signal in order for their
type to be known without changing much.
9I use stable in the well-known sense of Gale and Shapley (1962). Matching a high type observer
with a low type contributor is not stable as she could form a blocking pair to this proposed matching by
matching instead with any high quality contributor provisionally matched with a low quality observer.
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Specifically, I use the model of Compte and Postlewaite (2012) which analyzes
a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with private monitoring.10 The interpretation here
is the following. Each day a couple work independently (for example, one hunts,
the other gathers) and each may share the food obtained (cooperate) or consume
it all without sharing (defect). Since the success of foraging varies, even when
no food is shared, an individual does not know for certain whether her partner
has defected or was just unlucky. Compte and Postlewaite (CP) assume that
each period, both partners each receive a private informative signal about the
behavior of the other partner. The novel interpretation proposed here is that
the accuracy of the signal is increasing in an individual’s ability to mentalize.11
The interpretation is quite natural in that CP themselves give a psychological
interpretation to their model. In the equilibrium they propose, an individual
only defects when she is “upset”. Thus, an individual who can infer with relative
accuracy when her partner is upset can also infer with relative accuracy when her
partner defects.
I now outline the model of CP with a simple extension to allow for signal accu-
racy to differ for the two partners. This permits the analysis of the heterogeneity
in mentalizing ability that is the focus of the current study. Two players play an
indefinitely repeated game. Each period, each player i chooses an action ai from
the action set {C,D}. The expected payoffs from the players’ action choices in
each period are given by
(19)
C D
Cooperate 1, 1 −L, 1 + L
Defect 1 + L, −L 0, 0
for some L > 0. Actions taken by the other player are not observed, but each
period after actions are taken, a player i receives a signal yi that can be good
(yi = 1) or bad (yi = 0). The assumption is that
pi = Pr{yi = 0|aj = D} = Pr{yi = 1|aj = C}
with pi >
1
2 . Further, at the start of each period players receive a public signal
z ∈ {0, 1} with q = Pr{z = 1} with q ∈ (0, 12). The public signal is used to
coordinate a return to cooperation after a period of punishment.
CP demonstrate that there can exist an equilibrium, hereafter the “CP equi-
librium”, of the repeated game of the following form. Each player is in one of
two states, N or U . When she is in N , she plays C and when in U she plays
D. She moves from N to U if and only if yi = 0 and z = 0, that is both private
10Private monitoring implies that players cannot observe the actions of other players with certainty
but in each period each player receives a private signal about the other player’s action in the previous
period. See, for example, Kandori (2002) for an introduction.
11Mohlin (2012) and Monte, Robalino and Robson (2012) have recently proposed quite different models
of theory of mind applied to strategic situations.
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and public signals are bad. She then stays in state U until the public signal is
good, i.e. if z = 1, when she returns to N . CP show that such an equilibrium
exists for a range of parameter values q and L but under the assumption that
both players have the same level of accuracy p. In the Appendix, I show that the
CP equilibrium still exists if p1 and p2 are not too dissimilar and if they are close
to one.
Further, it is shown here that, in the CP equilibrium, fitness is increasing in
mentalizing ability. There is a potential complication in that mentalizing in-
dividuals are assumed to have altruistic preferences. Crucially, however, these
altruistic preferences do not change the actions taken or the material payoffs
earned in equilibrium. The problem rather is that the CP equilibrium may not
exist, as completely altruistic agents would switch to always playing C, and thus
eroding the advantage that mentalizing would give in the CP equilibrium. It is
shown formally in the Appendix that the CP equilibrium continues to exist as
long as the level of altruism is not too high.12 Further, some numeric work (also
in the Appendix) in fact indicates that small or intermediate levels of altruism
actually make playing this equilibrium easier.
Embedding this in the signalling and matching model considered here, let the
accuracy of the signals of the two players be p1(α) and p2(v), where v is the ob-
server quality as introduced in the previous subsection on matching. The accuracy
of these two signals are assumed to be strictly increasing in α and v respectively.
That is, a high type contributor has a more accurate signal, just as the signal
accuracy of an observer is increasing in her quality.
Just as do CP, I consider the long run payoffs of the repeated game, that is,
those consistent with the probability distribution over the four possible states
(NN , NU , UN and UU) generated by equilibrium play. Let φij be the long run
probability that player 1 is in state i and player 2 is in state j. The expected long
run payoffs to player 1 are
(20) γ(p1, p2) = φNN (p1, p2)− LφNU (p1, p2) + (1 + L)φUN (p1, p2)
where the payoffs are derived from (19). These long run probabilities φij all
depend on p1, p2 and q as detailed in the proof to the next result. However, it is
relatively easy to calculate that
(21) φNN =
q
1− p1p2(1− q) .
That is the probability that both players cooperate in a given period is increasing
in the accuracy p1, p2 of their signals. This would justify both observers preferring
to match with high type contributors and contributors preferring high quality
12Even if small amounts of altruism means that the advantage through mentalizing is small, it will
still be strictly positive. Over many generations even small payoff differences imply big differences in
relative frequency.
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observers.
Furthermore, this probability satisfies ∂2φNN/∂p1∂p2 > 0 so that it has in-
creasing differences in p1 and p2. The point is that clearly a more accurate signal
avoids mistakes where player incorrectly perceives the other to have defected and
thus allows for more frequent successful cooperation. But more than that, to stay
in the good state NN , both players have to simultaneously avoid mistakes. Thus,
having a partner whose perception is more accurate increases the value of one’s
own accuracy.
Finally let
(22) pi(α, s) = sγ(p1(α), p2(vH)) + (1− s)γ(p1(α), p2(vL)),
where s can take the values {sH , sM , sL} as detailed in the subsection above on
matching. That is, the overall project payoff pi(α, s) is defined as the expected
payoff taken over both the matching process and play in the repeated game.
PROPOSITION 6: Given the CP equilibrium, where both players play C in N ,
play D in U , the payoff γ(p1(α), p2(v)), for p1p2 close enough to 1 and for 0 <
L < 1/q − 1, is increasing in both α and v and, further, γ12 > 0. Thus, pi(α, s)
as defined as (22), is increasing in both arguments and has piαs > 0.
PROOF:
The probability of staying in state NN is q+(1−q)p1p2, whilst the probability
of transiting back to NN from any other state is q. Thus, this implies that
φNN = q + (1 − q)p1p2φNN , which is easily solvable to give (21). It is also
possible to calculate
φNU =
p1(1− p2)(1− q)
q + p1(1− q) φNN , φUN =
(1− p1)p2(1− q)
q + p2(1− q) φNN .
One can check that these probabilities are well defined and continuous for all
values of p1, p2 and q in [0,1]. Further, one can calculate directly if tediously
from the above and (20) that
∂γ(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=1
= −2−L(1−q)+ 1
q
+q;
∂γ(p1, p2)
∂p2
∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=1
= L(1−q)+ 1
q
−1.
The first is strictly positive if L < 1/q − 1 as assumed. The second is clearly
positive for q < 1. Further
∂2γ(p1, p2)
∂p1∂p2
∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=1
= γ12(1, 1) =
(1− q)2(2 + q2)
q2
> 0.
Thus we have γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0 and γ12 > 0 in the neighborhood of p1 = p2 = 1.
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Since p1(α) is strictly increasing in α, both γ and pi, as defined in (22), are
increasing in α. Further, we have pis = γ(p1(α), p2(vH)) − γ(p1(α), p2(vL)) > 0.
Finally, piαs = p
′
1(α) (γ1(p1(α), p2(vH))− γ1(p1(α), p2(vL))) > 0 as γ12 > 0.
Note that this proposed equilibrium payoff structure is robust to deviations
at the first stage. Suppose a low-type contributor deviates and chooses xH . He
would be mistaken for a high type and could match appropriately with a high
type observer. But as his signal accuracy in the repeated relationship would be
only p(αL), his payoff in the project would be as required sHγ(p1(αL), p2(vH)) +
(1 − sH)γ(p1(αL), p2(vL)) = pi(αL, sH) < pi(αH , sH) = sHγ(p1(αH), p2(qH)) +
(1−sH)γ(p1(αH), p2(vL)). Thus, the proposed deviation would not be profitable.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown the following. If having a theory of mind, “men-
talizing”, is positively associated with empathy, then those possessing these joint
attributes can signal this otherwise hidden capability by prosocial behavior. It
is shown that mentalizing contributes positively to the return from long-run re-
lationships and thus is a desirable attribute in a partner. Successfully signalling
one’s type therefore increases the quality of partner.
Thus, it has been shown that other-regarding preferences would survive even
though these preferences differ those that would maximize (short-run) fitness.
However, one should recognize the limits of this result. Strictly speaking, the
model considered here only allows for pro-social behavior in the particular con-
text of demonstrating one’s fitness for matching into a long term relationship.
Such behavior may or may not extend into other contexts.13 It is also important
to emphasize that this proposed explanation for cooperative behavior does not
exclude other explanations, particularly those based on reciprocity and repeated
games. Indeed, one aspect of the current model is the interplay between a short
term interaction in a matching market and a longer term relationship after match-
ing. Finally, sustaining a cooperative equilibrium in repeated relationships is not
possible if altruism is too high. This suggests why altruism, although providing
a fitness advantage at low but positive levels, does not increase without limit.
Mathematical Appendix
In Compte and Postlewaite (2012) it is shown that an equilibrium for both
players to play C in N and D in U , for a non-empty set of the parameter space
(L, p, q). In this appendix, building on this result, I briefly show that the CP
equilibrium can still exist when the accuracy probability of private signals p is
not equal across the two players.
13How much people discriminate between different contexts in such behavior is unclear. Indeed, one
prominent alternative explanation for cooperation in short-run encounters is simply that it represents the
mistaken use of reciprocal behavior in an inappropriate context (West, El Mouden and Gardner (2011)).
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PROPOSITION 7: Fix L and q at values such that if p2 = p1 = p the CP
equilibrium exists for p on the interval [p0, 1] for some p0 < 1. Then, for p1
close enough to one, there exists p and p¯ such that p¯ > p1 > p and such that if
p2 ∈ [p, p¯], the CP equilibrium exists.
PROOF:
The upper bound p¯ for p2 is set by the condition that player 1 should not have
an incentive to switch to playing C always, and p is fixed by the incentive for
player 1 not to deviate to all D. The first condition is
(A1) γ(p1, p2) ≥ φCN − L(1− φCN ) = (1 + L)
q
q + (1− q)(1− p2) − L,
where φCN is proportion of time player 2 spends in state N when player 1 deviates
to all C. Fix p1 at some value in (p0, 1). Then let p¯ be the value of p2 that solves
(A1) with equality. The second is
(A2) γ(p1, p2) ≥ (1 + L)φDN = (1 + L)
q
q + (1− q)p2 ,
where φDN is proportion of time player 2 spends in state N when player 1 deviates
to all D. Similarly define p as the value that solves (A2) with equality. It
is possible to verify that γ(p1, p2) as given in (20) is strictly increasing in p2.
Further, one can verify that, for p2 close to 1, the right hand side of (A1) is
greater than that of (A2) provided again that L < 1/q− 1. Thus p¯ > p. Suppose
p1 /∈ (p, p¯), then this would contradict the existence of equilibrium, for which the
incentive not to defect is strict, for p1 = p2 = p ∈ (p0, 1), given the continuity of
payoffs in p1 and p2.
For example, take L = 1, q = 0.3, then from CP, p0 is approximately 0.851, so
that the symmetric equilibrium exists for p ∈ [0.851, 1]. Keeping these values for
L and q, but moving to differing accuracy levels, let the accuracy level of player
one be p1 = 0.9. Then, one can calculate that p = 0.852 and p¯ = 0.967. That is,
an asymmetric equilibrium exists if player 2’s accuracy is between these levels.
Altruism in the Post-Match Project
I briefly look at the implications of altruistic preferences for the repeated inter-
action of the post-match project. I show that the CP equilibrium exists as long
as the altruism parameter is not too large.
Suppose players 1 and 2 have altruism levels α1 and α2 respectively. Then
subjectively they are playing the following game:
(A3)
C D
Cooperate 1 + α1, 1 + α2 −L+ α1(1 + L), 1 + L− α2L
Defect 1 + L− α1L, −L+ α2(1 + L) 0, 0
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The subjective payoff in the CP equilibrium, rather than (20), will be
(A4) γ(p1, p2;α) = (1 + α)φNN + (−L+ α(1 + L))φNU + (1 + L− αL)φUN .
Importantly, this change in subjective payoffs has no effect on the findings of
Proposition 6 which considers the effect of play on fitness, provided both partners
continue to play the CP equilibrium.
The problem is, as Bernheim and Stark (1988) pointed out, altruism can hinder
cooperation in repeated relationships, as it makes individuals unwilling to punish
those who have deviated. Here this effect manifests itself in the question of
existence of the CP equilibrium. For sufficiently high levels of altruism, the CP
equilibrium ceases to exist as individuals will prefer to switch to all C.14
I show that the CP equilibrium still exists if altruism α is less than α∗, defined
as
(A5) α∗ =
L(1− φCN ) + φN − φCN
L(1− φCN ) + 1− φN
which is strictly positive if L > L where L is the lower bound that CP derive
for the existence of their equilibrium (L = (φCN − φN )/(1 − φCN ) > 0 where
φN = φNN + φUN ). That is, if and only if the parameters are such that the CP
equilibrium exists, the CP equilibrium still exists under some degree of altruism.
PROPOSITION 8: Fix L and q at values such that if p2 = p1 = p the CP
equilibrium exists for p on the interval [p0, 1] for some p0 < 1. Fix p ∈ (p0, 1).
Then for altruistic preferences (A3), the symmetric CP equilibrium still exists if
α < α∗. Further, suppose that p1 6= p2. Then, for p1 close enough to one, there
exists p and p¯ such that p¯ > p1 > p and such that if p2 ∈ [p, p¯], the CP equilibrium
exists.
PROOF:
Take the incentive compatibility condition (A1), impose the modified payoffs
(A3) to obtain,
(A6) γ(p1, p2;α) ≥ φCN (1 + α) + (−L+ α(1 + L))(1− φCN ).
Note that with the CP assumption that p1 = p2 = p, γ(p1, p2, ;α) = (1 + α)γ(p).
Thus the above solves under equality to obtain α∗ as given in (A5). The other
condition (A2) becomes
(A7) γ(p1, p2;α) ≥ (1 + L− αL)φDN .
14This is a problem as if altruists play C instead of the CP equilibrium, fitness in the post-match
project will no longer be increasing in mentalizing ability. Thus, a population of altruists could be
invaded by individuals who do not mentalize but who, in contrast to the situation in the CP equilibrium,
would suffer no fitness disadvantage.
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Again assuming p1 = p2 so that γ(p1, p2, ;α) = (1 +α)γ(p), it can be seen that if
the above inequality is satisfied for α = 0 then it is clearly satisfied for any α > 0.
Now let p1 6= p2. One finds p from (A6) and p¯ from (A7). Again, γ(p1, p2;α) is
increasing in p2 and one can verify that, for p2 close to 1, the right hand side of
(A6) is greater than that of (A7) provided again that L < 1/q − 1. Thus p¯ > p.
For example, consider L = 1, q = 0.3 and p1 = p2 = 0.9, then for altruism
above α∗ = 0.26, individuals earn a higher subjective payoff from playing all C.
Nonetheless, it seems that low values of altruism aid cooperation relatively to
no altruism in that the CP equilibrium exists for a wider part of the parameter
space. Again take L = 1, q = 0.3 and p1 = 0.9. Above it was calculated that
p = 0.852 and p¯ = 0.967 so that the permissable range for player 2’s accuracy
is p¯ − p = 0.967 − 0.852 = 0.115. Suppose now α2 = 0.2. Then p = 0.728
and p¯ = 0.923 so that p¯ − p = 0.923 − 0.728 = 0.195. Altruism changes both
constraints, making it both less attractive to switch to all D and more attractive
to switch to all C. This numeric example indicates that for low levels of altruism,
the first effect is stronger.
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